This study introduces some new perspectives of bureaucratic corruption into the dynamic general equilibrium theory recently proposed by Zhang. The main concern of our study is the role of corruption on economic growth and income and wealth distribution between the officials and workers. The economy is composed of the industrial sector and public sector. The population is classified into officials and workers. Corruption takes places through many channels. Officials take brides from producers and households. The model describes dynamic interactions of growth, corruption with fixed tax rate and corruption rates. We simulate the model to demonstrate existence of equilibrium and motion of the dynamic system. We also examine effects of changes in different parameters on the motion of the economic system.
The basic model
We consider that the economy is composed of one industrial sector and one public sector. There is a single good, called industrial good, in the economy and the price of the industrial good is unity. Capital depreciates at a fixed rate, . k  Most aspects of the industrial sector are similar to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model (Burmeister and Dobell, 1970; Barro and Salai-Martin, 1995) . The population consists of officials and workers. Each group is homogenous and the population of each group is fixed. Workers are fully employed by the industrial sector and officials are fully employed by the public sector. Households own assets of the economy and distribute their incomes to consume and save. The industrial sector uses labor and capital inputs to produce goods. Exchanges take place in perfectly competitive markets. Factor markets work well and factors are fully utilized at every moment. Saving is undertaken only by households. Let subscripts j . Here, we assume that officials' work time is also endogenous. It is considered that a rise in income due to wage increase or corruption affects officials' work time.
The industrial sector
We specify the industrial sector's production function as follows
(1) 
The total value of wealth that the representative household can sell to purchase goods and to save is  .
t k
We assume that selling and buying wealth can be conducted instantaneously without any transaction cost. The disposable income is
We assume that the corruption rates on wealth and wage rate are respectively k  and .
w  After paying the corruption fee to the official, the representative household's disposable income 
where    . 
where
is determined by the government budget. The official wage rate is proportional to the worker's market wage rate. The representative official receives the total income due to corruption as follows
The representative official's disposable income 
t c
The budget constraint implies Insert (9) and (5) 
The utility functions and optimal decisions
The representative household in each group chooses three variables,  , 
This equation simply means that change in the wealth is equal to saving minus dissaving.
The public sector
The public sector is financially supported by the government's tax income. The public sector's income is  .
t F 
We assume that the service that the public provides is dependent only on the officials' labor input  , 
The government's tax income is
For simplicity of analysis we don't introduce possible corruption of the officials on governance and government expenditures. The interaction between corruption and governance may affect the efficiency of public spending, which will influence growth (Dzhumashev, 2014) .
Wealth being owned by the households
The sum of the wealth owned by the two groups is equal to the national capital
The total demand equaling the total supply
The total demand for the product is equal to the supply
We built the model. The dynamic general equilibrium model describes the interdependence between wealth accumulation of the workers and officials, public good supply, income and wealth distribution, endogenous labor supply, and economic structure with different ways of corruption. The rest of the paper deals with properties of the model.
The behavior of the model
This section examines properties of the nonlinear dynamic model. We introduce a variable
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The following lemma shows that the motion of the entire economic system can be described by two differential equations.
The following lemma is checked in the Appendix.
Lemma
The dynamics of the economic system is governed by the following two differential equations with the tax rate as the variable
is are functions of   
The ratio between the number of the workers and the number of the officials is 
The official's propensity to save is higher than the worker's propensity to save. Intuitively this implies that in this neoclassical growth model corruption may benefit economic growth as the wealth is shifted from the group with the lower propensity to save to the group with higher propensity to save. The two groups have the same level of human capital. The tax rate is fixed at one percent. We specify the initial conditions as follows
The changes of the variables over time are plotted in Figure 1 . The workers supply more labor and the officials work less over time. The national product and wealth rise. The rate of interest falls. The wage rates and wage incomes are enhanced. The equilibrium values of the variables are given as follows (20) where
The eigenvalues are
The equilibrium point is stable. This result is important as it allows us to effectively conduct comparative dynamic analysis.
Comparative Dynamic Analysis
The previous section plotted the motion of the economic system with the initial condition. This section shows how a change in any parameter alters the motion of the system. As the system is stable and we can plot the motion of the system, we can effectively conduct comparative dynamic analysis. We use the variable, 
A rise of the corruption rate on the output level
We first study how the economic system is affected when the corruption rate on the output level is increased as follows: initially and consumes more and has more wealth in the long term. The representative worker consumes less. The work has more wealth initially and less wealth in the long term. In the long term the worker works longer hours and the nation has more capital. As the wealth accumulated to the corrupt official is partly saved, the national capital is increased. The rate of interest is reduced. The long-term impact is the national economic growth.
Figure 2. A Rise of the Corruption Rate on the Output Level

A rise of the corruption rate on the capital income
We now allow the corruption rate on the capital income to be increased as follows: 
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A rise of the corruption rate on the wage income
The corruption rate on the wage income is increased as follows:
The long-term effects of the change in the corruption rate on the wage income are similar to the effects of the change in the corruption rate on the output level. The country's output is increased. The officials have more wealth and consume more. The workers have less wealth and consume more. It should be noted that when the corruption rate on the capital income is increased, the worker's wage rate and wage income are increased; when the corruption rate on the wage income is increased, the worker's wage rate and wage income are reduced. We fix the total population. We now consider that the share of officials in the population is increased. The expansion of the public sector may be due to different reasons. We now consider the following shift of the labor force structure The workers' total labor supply rise initially and fall in the long term. The officials' total labor supply rise and public service is increased. It should be noted that in the literature of corruption and growth there are opposite conclusions. One argument is that a rise in the government size may produce more opportunities for corruption (e.g., Goel and Nelson, 1998 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) . The other argument is that an enlarged government sector may strengthen control of corruption and thus encourage economic growth (Billger and Goel, 2009 ). Our study shows that the two effects exist -in the short term economic growth is encouraged but in the long-term economic growth is discouraged. The government tens to encourage workers' human capital, for instance, through subsiding education and providing differential education programs. We now allow the workers' human capital to be changed as follows:
The ratio between the official's actual wage and the market wage is enlarged. The corrupt income per official rises. The official's wage rate per unit time and wage income are increased. The official works less hours. The officials' total labor supply falls and public service is reduced. The official's consumption level and wealth are increased. The official class benefits. The worker's wage rate per unit time and wage income are increased. The worker's working time is increased. The worker's consumption level and wealth rise initially and fall in the long term. The workers' total labor supply rise. The national wealth and output are increased. The rate of interest rises. We see that the worker class does not benefit in the long term. 
Concluding Remarks
This study developed a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous wealth and corruption. The economy is composed of one (private) production sector and one public sector. The public service sector is carried out by officials. Its cost is financially supported by taxation on the private sector. Its output affects the private sector's productivity and the people's welfare. The production sector employs the workers' labor inputs and capital. The population is classified into workers and officials. We assume that officials are corrupt in the sense that they take bribes from the private sector and households. The corruption is measured by the corruption rates on the output level of the private sector, the wealth interest returns of the workers, and the wage income of the workers. We simulated the model and examined the transitory and long-run effects of changes in some parameters. The comparative dynamic analysis provided insights into the complicated impact of corruption on economic growth process. For instance, if the workers' human capital is enhanced, then (i) the ratio between the official's actual wage and the market wage is enlarged; (ii) the corrupt income per official rises; (iii) the official's wage rate per unit time and wage income are increased; (iv) the official works less hours and public service is reduced; (v) the official's consumption level and wealth are increased; (vi) the worker's consumption level and wealth rise initially and fall in the long term; (vii) the workers' total labor supply rise, the national wealth and output are increased; and (viii) the official class benefits and the worker class loses in the long term. The enhanced human capital by the workers will not benefit themselves in the long term, even though they benefit in the short term. As mentioned before, although there is a vast literature on corruption, there are relatively few macroeconomic growth models with endogenous wealth in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Hence, our model can be generalized and extended in different ways. For instance, there are many other possible channels of corruption. We may also introduce institutional structure to allow corruption networks. The workers are not homogenous and the officials are heterogeneous in regard to morality, position and human capital. In an economic system with endogenous knowledge, corruption may not encourage innovative activities as innovators need government's support (e.g., Mo, 2001) .
Appendix: Proving the Lemma
From (2) we have 
